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Patenting Life: The Potential and the
Pitfalls of Using the WTO to Globalize
Intellectual Property Rights
Introduction
Although the concept of intellectual property rights dates back
to the fourth century B.C.,' the movement toward creating an
international standard for protecting innovation is a relatively new
development.2 The most significant step in this trend is the recent
delegation of intellectual property issues to the decision-making
and regulatory bodies of the World Trade Organization.' The
adoption of the far-reaching Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Agreement 4 (hereinafter the TRIPs Agreement) belies
both the complexities inherent in achieving a universal standard
for intellectual property management and the significant
divergence of interests remaining in the field.6 These complexities
and divergent interests are exemplified by the controversy
I GEOFF TANSEY, TRADE, INTELLECTUAL PROP., FOOD AND BIODIVERSITY: KEY
ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR THE 1999 REVIEW OF ARTICLE 27.3(B) OF THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT. (A Discussion Paper commissioned by Quaker Peace & Serv., London in
association with Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva with financial assistance from
the Dep't for Int'l Dev., U.K.), at 3 http://www.zen.co.uk/home/pge/g.tansey/trips-
bw.pdf (Feb. 1999).
2 Karen A. Monroe et al., International Overview of Trademarks and Copyrights,
in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW: NEW DEVELOPMENTS 5 (Dennis Campbell
& Susan Cotter eds., 1995). Intellectual property rights have been the subject of
extensive international agreements, beginning with the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property of 1883 and continuing through the recent, and most
rigorous, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement of 1994. See id. at 6-
19.
3 See Lynne Saylor & John Beton, Why the TRIPS Agreement?, in INTELLECTUAL
PROP. & INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND TRIPS AGREEMENT
15 (Tania Saulnier et al. eds., 1996).
' General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The
Uruguay Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, art. 2.1, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
5 See id. at 3-15.
6 See id. at 15.
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surrounding the patenting of life forms.7 Stemming from the
cultural and economic differences between developing and
developed nations,8 this controversy also draws into sharp focus
many of the pitfalls, both real and perceived, of relying on the
unique structure of the World Trade Organization to establish
uniform trade standards.9 This comment surveys the landscape of
this controversy and assesses the implications of possible
developments for both the field of international intellectual
property law and the future of the World Trade Organization. Parts
I and II briefly explore the general goals and philosophies behind
recognizing intellectual property rights, with specific emphasis on
the connection to biological entities.'" Parts III and IV focus on the
functioning of the World Trade Organization and the current status
of the TRIPs Agreement." Part V outlines the remaining
challenges of attempting to establish a global standard for
patenting life forms and using the World Trade Organization to do
it.1
2
I. The Purpose of Intellectual Property Rights
Genius is one percent inspiration and ninety-nine percent
perspiration.
-Thomas Edison
This oft-heard Edison quote reflects the basic philosophy
I See Kevin W. McCabe, The January 1999 Review of Article 27 of the TRIPs
Agreement: Diverging Views of Developed and Developing Countries Toward the
Patentability of Biotechnology, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 41, 43-45 (1998).
8 See id.
9 See World Trade Organization, Seattle: What's At Stake? A Resource Booklet
for the Seattle Ministerial Meeting 27, 33, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/
ministe/min99_e/english/booke/stake.pdf (Nov. 1999) [hereinafter Seattle Meeting].
Concerns commonly associated with the World Trade Organization include: whether it is
undemocratic and undermines the sovereignty of governments; whether it values the
interests and needs of developed nations to the detriment of developing countries; and
whether it is indifferent to advocates for the protection of the environment, health and
safety. ld; see also Andrew L. Strauss, From GATTzilla to the Green Giant: Winning the
Environmental Battle for the Soul of the World Trade Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 769, 769-75 (1998).
10 See infra notes 13-92 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 93-209 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 210-75 and accompanying text.
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behind traditional intellectual property rights. Intellectual property
rights (hereinafter IPRs) are founded on the assumption that
inventions are the product of nothing more than individual labor
and investment.'3 IPRs create private property rights in developers
of new knowledge to compensate them for the labor and resources
expended during the creative process.'4 By rewarding research and
development, IPRs systems are intended to foster the creation and
dissemination of new knowledge, thereby benefiting society in
general as well as the individual inventors." Most developed
nations adhere to this philosophy and have established extensive
protective systems for IPRs.'6
Although dominant among developed nations, this
individualistic philosophy is not globally accepted. Many
developing countries regard knowledge as communal rather than
private property.' These societies value and encourage
intergenerational innovation, perceiving inventions not as purely
unique personal achievements but as extensions of existing ideas
and discoveries. 8 Furthermore, although they are the proprietors of
'1 See TANSEY, supra note 1, at 3.
14 See Kate H. Murashige, Harmonization of Patent Laws, 16 Hous. J. INT'L L.
591, 592 (1994). In the United States, this individual reward philosophy was recognized
and validated by the United States Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (holding that Ohio's trade secret law does not contradict the
purpose of federal patent laws and is not preempted by them).
'5 See McCabe, supra note 7, at 46; Murashige, supra note 14, at 594. Although
widely recognized as effective in certain fields such as pharmaceutical development,
some commentators have questioned whether IPR systems generally achieve their
expected beneficial results. IPR protections can limit the entry of new competitors into a
market effectively, stifling rather than fostering innovation. See TANSEY, supra note 1, at
4; see also VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE at
13 (1997) (stating that "[t]here is virtually no evidence that patents actually stimulate
invention.").
16 Lakshmi Sarma, Biopiracy: Twentieth Century Imperialism in the Form of
InternationalAgreements, 13 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L J. 107, 107 (1999).
17 Id. at 108.
18 Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights & Sovereignty: New
Dilemmas in International Law Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and
the Conservation of Biodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59, 77, 80 (1998); see
also Sarma, supra note 16, at 108 (stating that many developing nations.believe
inventive processes for which patents are being granted have their foundations in
previous knowledge and the utilization of biological plant and food systems).
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much of the world's uncultivated natural resources'9 and the
caretakers of extensive indigenous knowledge, ° these nations are
less technologically advanced than their industrialized
counterparts. As a public policy, countries in this position
recognize the value of employing copying strategies as a means of
catching up technologically. 2' These cultural and economic forces
counsel against strict IPR regimes, and until recently, many
developing countries did not adopt or enforce IPRs.2
In addition to differing on the general applicability of IPRs,
developed and developing nations clash over the appropriateness
of creating private property protection in sensitive subject areas
such as biotechnology. 23 Biotechnology involves both living
organisms and non-living biological material.24 Biotechnological
innovations also encompass the development of processes which
create or modify living organisms or biological material, the
products of those processes, or the subsequent use of those
products.25 Despite the widespread use of biotechnology in
medicine, energy, and agriculture, there is substantial international
variation in the protection afforded these innovations. 26 These
'9 Sarma, supra note 16, at I11.
20 See Coombe, supra note 18, at 77. Definitions of indigenous knowledge vary,
but the phrase typically refers to folk or popular knowledge that reflects "symbiotic
relationships between individuals, communities, generations, the physical environment,
and other living creatures and the spiritual relationships of a people." Id. (quoting
Howard Mann from an unpublished paper, Intellectual Property Rights, Biodiversity and
Indigenous Knowledge: A Critical Analysis in the Canadian Context (1997)).
21 Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, TRIPs: Background, Principles and General Provisions,
in INTELLECTUAL PROP. AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPs AGREEMENT 3, 4-5
(Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998). This practice is not unique to
currently developing nations. As a young country, the United States also limited
international intellectual property rights in order to further its social and economic
development. Id.
22 Id.
23 See generally TANSEY, supra note 1 (discussing moral and ethical issues
tangential to the application of patents to life forms).
24 See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROP.
THEORY AND PRACTICE 33.20 (1997). "Living organisms" refers to plants, animals, and
microorganisms. Id. Non-living biological material refers to seeds, cells, enzymes, and
plasmids. Id.
25 Id.
26 See id. 33.23, 33.25-33.29. The patent laws of the United States allow for
protection of all forms of biotechnological innovation. Id. 33.34. The laws of many
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differences stem primarily from perceptions of this type of
innovation as either a scientific discovery or an invention.7
Additionally, commentators have debated whether
biotechnological innovations meet the standard patentability
requirements of novelty2 and non-obviousness 29 and the common
registration requirements ° of describability and reproducability3
Thus, differences between nations on IPR issues encompass
cultural, economic, and administrative concerns not easily
harmonized through one international agreement.32
other countries, including Cuba, Mexico, Thailand, and the members of the European
Patent Convention, explicitly exempt from protection plant and animal varieties and
essentially biological processes for producing them. Id. 911 33.30, 33.33. But see Legal
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council, Council Directive 98/44/EC, art. 4(l)(a), 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13,18
(indicating the possible patentability of plants per se, though not plant varieties).
27 See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 24, 33.27. Discoveries are
generally not protectable, but inventions that require human intervention are. Id.
28 See Margaret A. Boulware et al., Introduction: Novelty & Non-obviousness, in
16 Hous. J. INT'L L. 441, 446-49, 465-66 (1994). Most countries require that patentable
material be absolutely novel, meaning that there has been no public disclosure or
commercial exploitation of the invention prior to the filing of the application. Id. The
European definition of novelty mandates that the invention not be "part of the state of the
art," which is a difficult determination to make in the natural world. Id. at 465.
29 Id. at 466-67. The non-obvious, or inventive step, requirement demands that the
invention not be evident to a person of ordinary skill in the relevant technical field. Id.
An invention is obvious if an average person in the field would be likely to discover it
from information available in the public domain. Id. Although this test is standard in
most developed countries, some apply it subjectively to limit protection of
biotechnology. Id. The United States applies it objectively to find a broader array of
inventions patentable. Id.
30 See Geertrui Van Overwalle, Patent Protection for Plants: A Comparison of
American and European Approaches, 39 IDEA 143, 155-58 (1999).The registration
requirements of describability and reproducibility ensure that the invention meets the
patentability requirement of being intrinsically useful. Id. The registration requirements
also appropriately limit the scope of protection provided and facilitate the significant IPR
goal of general knowledge dissemination. Id.
31 See generally id. at 148-59. Describability limits IPR protections to the
characteristics of innovations that can be adequately described through words, thereby
differentiating the registered invention from similar products. See id. at 154-56.
Reproducibility ensures that only inventions that can be consistently recreated, and thus
may be industrially applicable, are provided protection. See id. at 156-57.
32 Doris Estelle Long, Underlying Theories: Harmonization, in INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW 82, 82-83 (Anthony D'Amato & Doris Estelle Long eds.,
1997).
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A. The International Treatment of IPRs Related to Life Forms
Historically, the substantive aspects of IPR laws have been
determined nationally rather than internationally, and thus have
reflected each country's unique stand on the relevant philosophical
and policy issues.3 IPR systems may vary according to the types
of innovations protected,3" the forms of protection offered,35 the
length of protection,36  and the terms of enforcement. 7
Traditionally, fundamental differences between nations in the
substantive and procedural protections of intellectual property
systems have been an accepted part of international IPR
agreements." Prior to the adoption of the revolutionary TRIPs
agreement, the multinational agreements most relevant to the
controversy surrounding the protection of biotechnological
inventions were the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property (hereinafter Paris Convention), the
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
(hereinafter UPOV Acts), and the Convention on Biological
Diversity (hereinafter Biodiversity Convention)." An
33 Id.
34 Doris Estelle Long & Anthony D'Amato, Introduction: Forms of Intellectual
Property, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW, supra note 32, at 3-6 (Anthony
D'Amato & Doris Estelle Long eds., 1997). For example, patents generally protect
"novel and non-obvious functional aspects of useful articles or processes." Boulware et
al., supra note 27, at 16. Contrary to the preference of the United States, which would
like to expand the definition of patentable subject matter, many countries' patent laws
interpret this broad definition to include the processes used to make pharmaceutical
products, but not the products themselves. Long & D'Amato, supra note 32, at 3-4;
McCabe, supra note 7, at 43.
35 Long & D'Amato, supra note 32, at 3-6. The five basic types of intellectual
property are patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets and industrial designs. Id. In
addition to these standard forms of protection, countries may also offer utility models,
plant breeders' rights, droite de suites, and neighboring rights. See generally Doris
Estelle Long et al., Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW 1, supra
note 32, at 1-24. Patents and plant breeders' rights will be explained more fully in Part
IV. See infra notes147-209 and accompanying text.
36 Long & D'Amato, supra note 32, at 3-6.
37 Long & D'Amato, Introduction: Enforcement Issues, in INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW, supra note 32, at 15.
38 See Frederick M. Abbott, Introduction: The Current System for the International
Protection of Intellectual Property: Treaty Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROP. LAW, Supra note 32, at 13-14.
39 Boulware et al., supra note 28, at 17-18; TANSEY, supra note 1, at 9, 14.
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understanding of the basic provisions of these agreements is
necessary to comprehend recent developments in this area.
B. The Paris Convention
The Paris Convention," the first international union on IPRs,"
focuses on industrial property. This agreement was founded on the
principle of national treatment, which ensures the consistent
application of the IPR laws of all signatories, but does not define
their substance in any significant way.42 The Paris Convention
dictates that signatories provide foreigners the same IPR
protections given to their own citizens.43 Although the Paris
Convention also establishes minimum protective standards to be
incorporated into domestic laws, its main objective is to eradicate
discrimination rather than to normalize IPR regimes." A chief
concern about the current effectiveness of the Paris Convention is
that the latitude afforded by the national treatment principle
accommodates consistently weak protection of IPRs.45 Additional
concerns with the Paris Convention stem from its failure to specify
minimum terms for the length of patents and its lack of
meaningful dispute settlement mechanisms.46  The World
40 Paris Convention for Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, last
revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, art. 1(2), 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305
[hereinafter Paris Convention]. The Paris Convention protects industrial property,
including patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade
names, and indications of source or appellations of origins. It also guards against unfair
trade practices. Id.
41 Robert J. Gutowski, The Marriage of Intellectual Property and International
Trade in the TRIPs Agreement: Strange Bedfellows or a Match Made in Heaven?, 47
BUFF. L. REV. 713, 717-18 (1999). By 1887, Belgium, Brazil, France, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Salvador, Serbia, Spain, Switzerland,
Tunisia, the United Kingdom, and the United States had acceded to the convention. Id.
Prior to the ratification of the Paris Convention, the only protection for IPRs came from
limited bilateral agreements. Id.
42 See id. at 718-19.
43 Paris Convention, supra note 40, art. 2(1).
44 Gutowski, supra note 41, at 719.
45 See id. at 719-20. Under the national treatment principle, a nation with minimal
IPR laws for its own citizens may offer similarly weak protection to foreigners. Id. at
720. The Paris Convention ensures consistency in application, but creates no incentive to
enhance the degree of protection provided. See id.
46 Abbott, supra note 38, at 13.
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Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a specialized agency
of the United Nations, currently administers the terms of the Paris
Convention." WIPO's role as an observer during the negotiation
of the TRIPs Agreement evidences the continued vitality of the
Paris Convention, and despite its limitations, the Paris Convention
continues to serve as the foundation for subsequent international
IPR agreements."
C. The UPOV Acts
The UPOV Acts 9 represent more focused agreements that
foster the establishment of sui generis° IPR systems to protect the
rights of plant breeders.' Designed as an alternative to offering
patents on plant genera and species,52 the UPOV Acts protect new
41 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 24, 3.1.
48 Doris Estelle Long & Anthony D'Amato, WIPO's Future After TRIPs, in
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW, supra note 32, at 282. Provisions of the Paris
Convention were specifically incorporated into the TRIPs Agreement. TRIPs
Agreement, supra note 4.
49 The first convention of the International Union for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants was adopted by various European states in 1961. TANSEY, supra note
1, at 9. There have been three subsequent revisions to the original document, completed
in 1972, 1978 and 1991; the 1978 revision was the last one put into force. Id. The
modifications made in 1991 have not been fully enacted. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP.
ORG., supra note 24, T 27.80. As of October 1996, 31 states were parties to the UPOV
1978 Act and 16 states had signed, though not yet ratified, the UPOV 1991 Act. See id.
U 27.31, 27.80.
50 TANSEY, supra note 1, at 25. An alternative to traditional IPR regimes, a sui
generis system is a "unique form of protection tailored to a country's particular needs."
Id. Rather than implementing a standard form of protection, i.e. a copyright or patent
system, a sui generis system allows a country to develop its own rules to protect a
specific subject matter such as plant varieties. Id. at 8.
51 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 24, T 27.4. See also TANSEY,
supra note 1, at 8-9 (discussing the effectiveness of the UPOV as a sui generis system
developed to protect plant breeders' rights).
52 TANSEY, supra note 1, at 9. The 1978 Act specifically prohibits the patenting of
any materials protected by breeders' rights, ensuring that a country that recognizes
breeders' rights in plant varieties cannot also offer patents on those materials. WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 24, T 27.21. This provision limits the extent of
IPR protection available for plant varieties and ensures against double protection by the
patent and breeder's rights systems. Id. The prohibition on double protection was
reinforced by the European Patent Office, whose case law specifically assumed that the
subject matter excluded from patent protection was identical to materials covered by the
UPOV. Van Overwalle, supra note 30, at 169. The 1991 Act is silent on the question of
whether double protection is acceptable, suggesting that the issue may be resolved on a
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varieties of plants which are novel, distinct, and stable and whose
particular propagation features have sufficient uniformity. 3 The
terms of the UPOV Acts are further tailored to the unique
demands of protecting plant varieties by allowing for farmers'
privileges" and exemptions for further breeding,55 thus effectively
limiting the scope of protection to plant varieties used for
commercial purposes.56 Like the Paris Convention, the UPOV Acts
operate on the principle of national treatment.' The UPOV Acts
are administered by the UPOV body, an international
intergovernmental organization that works closely with the World
Intellectual Property Organization." Although widely accepted as
an effective convention, the UPOV Acts have needed to be revised
multiple times to keep pace with the changing demands of the
biotechnology industries. 9
country-by-country basis. TANSEY, supra note 1, at 9.
53 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 24, 27.10. The requirement of
novelty ensures that the plant variety has not previously been commercialized. TANSEY,
supra note 1, at 9. Distinctness mandates that the plant variety be sufficiently
distinguishable from other material. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 24,
27.10. Uniformity requires that protected plant varieties do not deviate significantly from
their standard description. Id. Stability demands that the plant variety retain its
distinguishing features from one generation to the next. Id.
54 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 24, 27.14. "Farmer's privileges
allow production of reproductive material, without obligation to the original breeder, so
long as the subsequent product is not commercially marketed. Thus, a farmer may
produce seed on his own farm for the purpose of resowing his farm." Id. The UPOV
1978 Act specifically allows for farmers' privileges, while the UPOV 1991 Act leaves
determination of the privileges up to each member nation. TANSEY, supra note 1, at 9.
55 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 24, 27.17. A fundamental
principle of the UPOV 1978 Act is the permissibility of unauthorized use of a protected
plant variety as an initial source in creating other varieties. Id. The UPOV 1991 Act
limited the scope of this exemption; by its terms, essentially derived varieties, which are
varieties created by the addition of a single gene to existing varieties, must be authorized
by the breeder of the original plant variety. Id. 27.65.
56 TANSEY, supra note 1, at 9.
57 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 24, T 27.22. National treatment
ensures that signatories provide the same level of protection to foreigners as to their own
citizens. Id.
58 Id. 27.6.
59 TANSEY, supra note 1, at 9. The impact of these revisions remains to be seen,
but critics are concerned with the loss of breeders' exemptions and the removal of the
prohibition on patenting UPOV protected material that occurred in the 1991 revisions.
Id. at 9-10.
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D. The Convention on Biological Diversity
Although primarily an agreement on environmental policy,
not intellectual property, 6 the Convention on Biological Diversity
includes many provisions relevant to the debate concerning
protection of rights in biotechnology.6' The agreement also
highlights conflicts between developing and developed countries
and their divergent interests in regulating biotechnology.62 The
aims of the Biodiversity Convention are to conserve biological
diversity, sustain the use of biological resources for current and
future generations, and promote the equitable sharing of the
benefits resulting from the use of such resources.63 The agreement
specifically recognizes member states' sovereign rights over their
biological resources and their concomitant authority to determine
who has access to those resources.64 It demands protection for the
rights of communities and indigenous people to customary use of
biological resources and knowledge systems.65 It recognizes the
interdependence among developing countries, which have control
of vast genetic resources, and developed nations, which have
dominion over most advances in technology.66 In recognition of
these competing interests, the Biodiversity Convention requires
60 David Hurlburt, The Cultural Impact of Intellectual Property Forms:
Biodiversity, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW, supra note 32, at 85.
61 Id.
62 Id. The Biodiversity Convention recognizes the interest of developing countries
in protecting their natural resources, preserving the rights of indigenous cultures, and
encouraging the transfer of technology; these interests clash with those of developed
nations intent on ensuring easy access to such resources and limited sharing of
technological innovations. Sarma, supra note 16, at 120-21. The acknowledgement of
these differences led to reluctance by at least one developed nation to sign the
Convention. Murashige, supra note 14, at 596-97. As of early 1999, 175 countries had
signed the Biodiversity Convention, although seven, including the United States, had not
ratified it. TANSEY, supra note 1, at 14.
63 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on
Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, 823 (1992) art. 1. [hereinafter
Biodiversity Convention].
64 Id. arts. 3, 15.
65 Id. arts. 8 (j), 10.
66 Sarma, supra note 16, at 121 (quoting Stevin M. Rubin & Stanwood W. Fish,
Biodiversity Prospecting: Using Innovative Contractual Provisions to Foster
Ethnobiological Knowledge, Technology, and Conservation, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L
& POL'Y 23, 32 (1994)).
[Vol. 26
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signatories to facilitate environmentally sound use of their
resources by other members, assuming adequate compensation is
provided.67 Signatories must also assist in the transfer of
technology that enables countries to capitalize on their own natural
resources, even if it requires sharing innovations protected by
intellectual property rights.6" The intention is to encourage
countries to recognize intellectual property type rights in
biological resources, which will in turn create incentive to
preserve biodiversity and promote sustainable development.69
Despite these lofty goals, the Biodiversity Convention's overly
broad standards and lack of enforcement mechanisms have
significantly limited its effectiveness."
II. IPRs and Biotechnology
The Biodiversity Convention and the 1991 UPOV Act
revisions, precursors to the revolutionary TRIPs Agreement,
reflect the international climate at the time of their promulgation.
The early 1990s saw increased emphasis on expanding intellectual
property rights governing biotechnology.7' This growing interest
was due in large part to the impact of biotechnological
developments in the fields of pharmaceuticals and agriculture. 2
67 Biodiversity Convention, supra note 63, arts. 15.2,15.7.
68 Id. art. 16.3. "In other words, if there is any conflict between protection of
intellectual property rights and the objectives of the treaty, then intellectual property
rights must give way." Hurlburt, supra note 60, at 87-88.
69 Murashige, supra note 14, at 596-97. For example, recognition of IPRs in
species rapidly becoming extinct in the rainforest creates a commercial incentive to
preserve them. Id.
70 Sarma, supra note 16, at 120; see also Hurlburt, supra note 60, at 85 (referring
to the treaty as "an impotent desideratum"). The Biodiversity Convention establishes a
general framework for international interaction on issues affecting domestic
environments, economies and IPR laws. Sarma, supra note 16, at 120; see Hurlburt,
supra note 60, at 85. The Biodiversity Convention established no vehicle for
implementation of these broad goals. Sarma, supra note 16, at 120.
71 See Cheryl D. Hardy, Comment, Patent Protection and Raw Materials: The
Convention on Biological Diversity and Its Implications for U.S. Policy Development
and Commercialization of Biotechnology, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 299, 303, 308
(1994).
72 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 24, $$ 33.19, 33.23. For
example, in 1996, Monsanto, a U.S.-based company, marketed a cotton variety
engineered to be resistant to the bollworm. In one year, the company collected $51
million dollars from this innovation. Shiva, supra note 15, at 36.
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The rapid pace of these developments led to an explosion of
biotechnology firms, especially in the United States." In a trend
unique to the biotechnology industry, most of the emerging
participants were small companies dedicated completely to
research and development. 4 In addition to there being many
independent competitors in the field, the industry's lengthy
research process" and high manufacturing and scale-up costs76
have made the field particularly capital-intensive.77 The costs and
risks of putting a biotech product on the market are compounded
by the complex regulations with which such products must
comply. 8 Furthermore, although they are initially difficult to
develop and successfully commercialize, many biotechnological
innovations are easily duplicated in their final stages. 9 This makes
such products unusually susceptible to piracy by competitors."
Demands for increased IPR protection for new biotech
developments emerged in response to the unique characteristics of
this high risk, high investment, and highly competitive industry.8'
Though responsive to the needs of the commercial
13 Hardy, supra note 70, at 301-02. "The biotechnology industry, in the United
States alone, comprised over 1000 small to medium companies in 1994, employed over
184,000 persons in 1992, and had revenues in excess of $52 billion in 1991." McCabe,
supra note 7, at 47.
74 Dan L. Burk, Misappropriation of Trade Secrets in Biotechnology Licensing, 4
ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 121, 136-37 (1994). These companies are frequently called
DBCs, short for dedicated biotechnology companies. Id.
71 McCabe, supra note 7, at 48. It is estimated that it takes ten to twelve years to
bring a biopharmaceutical drug to market. See id. This extended timeline typically causes
"a long delay between the start-up of a biotechnology firm and the marketing of its first
commercial product. Burk, supra note 73, at 138.
76 Burk, supra note 74, at 137-38; McCabe, supra note 7, at 48. It is estimated that
it takes $350-360 million to bring a biopharmaceutical drug to market. McCabe, supra
note 7, at 48 n.21. This figure does not take into account the extensive costs most DBCs
incur from failed products. Id. at 49.
77 Burk, supra note 74, at 137. Traditionally, most research in biotechnology was
done through universities, but as the profit potential of the field has increased, funding
from the private sector has become more common. Id. at 136-37.
78 McCabe, supra note 7, at 48. Estimates suggest the odds that a
biopharmaceutical compound will reach the market are one in five thousand. Id. These
numbers are comparable for other biotech products. Id. at n.24.
79 Id. at 48.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 50.
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competitors, the demand for increased IPR protection for
biotechnology has also generated significant alarm. Biotechnology
products are expected to contribute to advancements in curing
disease, increasing agricultural output, minimizing environmental
hazards, and obtaining energy. 2 Achievements in these areas are
essential to improving the quality of life in the world's developing
countries. IPR protection generally increases the immediate cost of
utilizing such innovations, and many developing nations are leery
of imposing this added cost on their impoverished citizens.83
Additionally, IPR protection, lauded as a means to foster
research and development, tends to focus on what will ultimately
be commercially marketable." These market-based priorities may
not coincide with the innovations most needed by small farmers
and other participants in less developed economies. 5 Concerns
have also been raised over the safety of the many new
biotechnology products reaching consumers,86 as well as the use of
biotech innovations to create captive markets in formerly self-
sufficient areas."
The increased profitability and commercialization of
biotechnology has also led to heightened awareness concerning
issues of biopiracy88 and biotechnology's potential ramifications
82 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 24, 33.23.
83 See TANSEY, supra note 1, at 19-20.
84 Id. at 20.
85 Id. One expert believes that "'miracle' technologies are not needed to solve the
global food security problem" and that focusing energy and investments on such
innovations diverts resources from efforts likely to have widespread, beneficial impact
on agricultural development. Id. at 20. This diversion of resources may restrict the
opportunity for constituencies other than individual inventors to profit from stronger IPR
regimes. Id.
86 Id. at 21. These concerns have focused primarily on the possible health risks of
genetically modified foods and have been particularly pronounced in Europe. See
Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johnson, Policy in Flux: The European Union's Laws on
Agricultural Biotechnology and Their Effects on International Trade, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC.
L. 243, 246 (1999).
87 TANSEY, supra note 1, at 21. Concerns in this area focus on the effect of
technological developments on subsistence farming, particularly through the propagation
of non-replicating seeds. Id.
88 Valentina Tejera, Tripping Over Property Rights: Is It Possible to Reconcile the
Convention on Biological Diversity with Article 27 of the TRIPs Agreement?, 33 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 967, 971 (1999). Biopiracy is the use of traditional knowledge and
resources without authorization by or compensation to its native communal caretakers.
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on resource drain and disruption of the environment.89 Although
curbed by the emergence of prospecting agreements between the
governments of biologically rich countries and private
corporations seeking use of those resources, " these concerns still
exist.9' The demand for enhanced IPR protections for the booming,
yet controversial, biotechnology industry was a significant factor
in the overall development of the 1994 TRIPs Agreement and
directly influenced specific provisions of that agreement.9 2
III. The TRIPs Agreement
The TRIPs Agreement was adopted within the framework of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,93
incorporating, for the first time, IPR protection into the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trades (GATT).4 The TRIPs
Agreement was one component of the Uruguay Round's
development of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
For example, in the early 1990s, the American company Eli Lilly discovered and
marketed the cancer-fighting properties of the Rosy Periwinkle plant, based on the
knowledge of folk healers in Madagascar; Eli Lilly made millions of dollars from this
development while Madagascar received nothing. Hardy, supra note 71, at 321.
89 TANSEY, supra note 1, at 19-21. Evidence suggests that the strengthening of
IPRs has restricted the flow of plant breeding materials, and thus effectively restricted
the development of new plant varieties by publicly funded research efforts. Id. Stronger
IPR protection has also been linked to an increase in the proliferation of genetically
engineered plants whose long-term effect on the environment is difficult to predict. Id. at
21.
90 Sarma, supra note 16, at 122. For example, the U.S. pharmaceutical firm Merck
has arranged to compensate Costa Rica in exchange for the right to systematically
explore its native plant species. Should Merck develop a marketable product through
these efforts, Costa Rica will also receive a portion of those profits. Murashige, supra
note 14, at 597.
91 Sarma, supra note 16, at 122. Ongoing concerns with prospecting agreements
focus on their failure to involve of indigenous cultures and their imposition of values of
developed countries on less developed nations. Id. at 122-23.
92 Tejera, supra note 88, at 976-77.
93 Michael L. Doane, The Uruguay Round Negotiations, in INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW 274, supra note 32, at 274-75. The Uruguay round was the
last ministerial meeting under the GATT Agreement. See id.
94 Yusuf, supra note 21, at 4. GATT is an instrument for liberalizing trade; it is
somewhat ironic that it should be used as a means to achieve greater protection for IPRs
because some suspect IPRs hamper free trade and competition. See id. at 8.
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Organization." The incorporation of IPR issues into GATT
discussions and ultimately into the framework of the World Trade
Organization was most strongly advocated by developed nations.96
They argued that the inclusion of IPR issues would help to
liberalize international trade, provide for more effective
enforcement of IPRs, and allow for negotiated benefits and
concessions across trade areas.97 Initially resisted by developing
countries, incorporation of IPR provisions became more appealing
to them as they adopted more free market policies and began to
feel pressured by isolated bilateral agreements.98
In 1990, a "Group of 14" developing nations99 submitted a
GATT proposal concerning regulation of counterfeit goods as well
as uniform substantive provisions for IPR protections.'" This
break-through proposal accomplished the three following
objectives: (1) it emphasized the importance of public policy
objectives underlying national IPR systems; (2) it insisted on the
necessity of respect for both national legal tradition regarding
IPRs and the diverse needs of the countries participating in the
negotiations; and (3) it attempted to minimize the actual
substantive IPR standards being considered.'"' The "Group of 14"
proposal established the framework for the agreement ultimately
adopted in 1994, and many of the developing nations' concerns
are reflected in the text of the TRIPs Agreement.'
2
95 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 24, 28.1. The Marrakech
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter the WTO
Agreement] was adopted on April 15, 1994. 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994). The World Trade
Organization [hereinafter the WTO] began operation on January 1, 1995. Id.
96 Yusuf, supra note 21, at 8. The United States and the European Economic
Community were strong supporters of the incorporation of IPR issues into GATT talks.
See id. at 9.
97 See id. at 8.
98 Id. at 9. For countries adopting free market policies, creating effective IPR laws
showed significant progress in that process, becoming viewed as tantamount to a good
conduct certificate. Id. By agreeing to a multilateral approach to IPR issues, developing
countries were also able to assert increased bargaining power to gain trade benefits in
other trade areas. See id.
99 Id. The nations involved were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba,
Egypt, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Tanzania, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe. Id. at n.13.
100 Id. at 9.
101 Id. at 10.
102 Id.
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A. General Provisions of the TRIPs Agreement
According to its terms, the objective of the TRIPs Agreement
is that:
[t]he protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation
and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.'03
This objective reflects the harmonizing of interests between
developed and developing nations, and specific provisions in the
agreement further reflect this balancing act. The TRIPs Agreement
adopts the substantive provisions of the existing intellectual
property conventions, including most of the Paris Convention. 4
The principle of national treatment is also expressly incorporated
into the TRIPs Agreement.' 5 The benefits of being a TRIPs
member are guaranteed through the incorporation of most-
favored-nation treatment.'06  Most-favored-nation treatment
requires signatories to afford to all other members any privileges
their national IPR system gives to foreigners.' 7 Most-favored-
nation treatment is a common feature of GATT agreements, but a
new development for international IPR regimes.' 0 The TRIPs
Agreement also establishes enhanced substantive and procedural
enforcement mechanisms, designed to give it more teeth than
previous IPR treaties.' 9
In addition to these general provisions, the TRIPs Agreement
establishes minimum national standards for IPR protection;
however, it does provide an exception permitting members to
103 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, art. 7.
104 See id. art. 2.1. The TRIPs Agreement is intended to coexist with prior
conventions without derogating any of the obligations of those agreements. Id. art. 2.2.
105 Id. art. 3.
106 Id. art. 4.
107 Id.
108 Yusuf, supra note 21, at 16.
109 German Cavelier, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, in INTELLECrUAL
PROP. & INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND TRIPs AGREEMENT,
supra note 3, at 65. The TRIPs Agreement's enforcement mechanisms are discussed in
depth in Part IV.
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"adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition,
and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to
their socio-economic and technological development.""'1 This
public policy exception allows member nations to retain a
considerable degree of legislative flexibility, subject to the caveat
that "such measures are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement.""' It is likely that this provision will allow nations to
take steps that conflict with individual TRIPs provisions, so long
as they are consistent with the Agreement as a whole." '2 The
specific terms of the Agreement set broad boundaries for the
protection of biotechnological inventions, with much ambiguity
remaining because of the liberal public interest exception, as well
as the incorporation of intentionally vague terms."3
B. Specific TRIPs Provisions Relating to Biotechnology
Article 27 of the TRIPs Agreement addresses IPR protection
through patents.14 It states that "patents shall be available for any
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step
and are capable of industrial application.""' 5 Member states must
offer this protection on a non-discriminatory basis, regardless of
10 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, art. 8.1.
" Id. See also Yusuf, supra note 21, at 13 (stating that the only restriction imposed
upon legislation on IPRs by member states to the TRIPS Agreement is that such
legislation is consistent with the Agreement's provisions). This seemingly broad
principle is a reflection of the Agreement's objective of balancing the diverse needs of
member countries. See id.
112 Yusuf, supra note 21, at 13.
"13 See generally TANSEY, supra note 1 (stating that the resulting TRIPs Agreement
was born from intense debate and a compromise between various national interests).
Article 27.3 (b) of the TRIPs Agreement most directly relates to the patenting of
biotechnological innovations. It includes nine words that are subject to interpretation.
These vague terms were purposefully incorporated to achieve a temporary compromise
on the thorny issues of recognizing IPR protection in biotechnology. See id. at 7.
"4 See generally TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4 (defining patentable subject
matter). Other forms of IPR protection, including copyrights, trademarks, geographical
indications, industrial designs, layout-designs of integrated circuits, protection of
undisclosed information, and control of anti-competitive practices in contractual
licenses, are dealt with elsewhere in the agreement. See id.
"15 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, art. 27.1. The terms "inventive step" and
"capable of industrial application" are considered synonymous with the requirements of
non-obviousness and usefulness. Id. n.5.
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the location of invention, the field of technology, or whether a
product is imported or locally produced. ' 16 In addition to this
general requirement, Article 70.8 outlines the application of this
protection to pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products."7
This Article requires that intermediate steps be taken to ensure
protection of these products. ' Protection is granted even during
the transitional period incorporated into the TRIPs Agreement that
allows less developed nations time to acquire appropriate
infrastructure to support compliant IPR regimes."9 This specialized
treatment is a reflection of the social and economic significance of
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products, as well as a
recognition of the need for IPR protection of these products. It is
noteworthy that this treatment is limited to the final product being
marketed and does not encompass the creative processes or
component parts of these products.' 20 Rather than mandating
protection, the TRIPs Agreement specifically exempts these more
controversial innovations from its general patent requirements. 121
Article 27.2 allows members to exclude from patentability
inventions whose commercial use would jeopardize the "ordre
public or morality" of their state.' 2 This broad provision explicitly
116 See id. art. 27.1. This provision reiterates the generally accepted principle of
national treatment. Id.
117 Id. art. 70.8.
I8 See id. art. 70.8. Intermediate protection is obtained by allowing exclusive
marketing rights for a product to be granted to the applicant while a patent is pending. Id.
art. 70.9. Exclusive marketing rights extend five years or until the patent is granted or
rejected, whichever period is shorter. Id. These protections are only afforded to products
that have been patented and marketed in at least one other member country since the
implementation of the TRIPs Agreement. Id.
"19 Article 65 sets forth the timeline according to which the original parties to the
TRIPs Agreement must comply with its minimum standards. Developed countries had to
implement the Agreement within one year of its entry into force; developing countries
had an extra four years (until January 2000). Economies in transition from centrally
planned to market-based economies also had until January 2000 to comply. The least
developed countries have at least a ten-year transition period (until January 2006), with
the option to apply for additional extensions. Id. arts. 65.1-65.3, 66.1.
120 See Carlos M. Correa, Patent Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROP. AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPs AGREEMENT, supra note 21, at 220-21.
121 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 27.2-27.3.
122 TANSEY, supra note 1, at 6. "Ordre public" is a nebulous term that refers to the
fundamentals of a society that cannot be derogated from without endangering the
society's basic institutions. Id.
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authorizes the exclusion of certain inventions from patentability in
order to "protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid
serious prejudice to the environment."'23 The only limitation to this
broad exception is that simply having a domestic law prohibiting
the exploitation of an invention will not by itself sufficiently
implicate the ordre public to qualify under these terms.' 24 In
addition to the potentially far-reaching ordre public exception
created by Article 27.2, Article 27.3(a) specifically allows
members to exclude from patentability "diagnostic, therapeutic




This exception reflects the acknowledged public interest in
stimulating widespread dispersion of therapeutic innovations.'
26
Although numerous provisions of the TRIPs Agreement
implicate the use of IPRs in relation to biological entities, the
article most relevant is Article 27.3(b).2 7 This Article expands the
types of subject matter that may be excluded from patentability to
include "plants and animals other than microorganisms.' 28 This
sweeping language creates an exception to patentability broader in
scope than that adopted by European nations and other legislative
bodies adopting a European stance.' 29 Under Article 27.3(b),
members may also exclude from patentability "essentially
123 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, art. 27.2.
124 Id.
125 Id. art. 27.3(a).
126 See Group of Negotiations on Goods (GATT) Negotiating Group on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods,
Communication from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India,
Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania, Uruguay & Pakistan, MTN.GNG/NG11 /W/71, ch. 2, arts. 4(1)-
4(2) (1990), in INTELLECTUAL PROP. AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPs
AGREEMENT, supra note 21, at 441, 446.
127 TANSEY, supra note 1, at 6-7.
128 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, art. 27.3(b).
129 Correa, supra note 120, at 194. According to European law, "only plant
varieties and animal races are not patentable." Id. This more limited exclusion, unlike the
TRIPs Agreement, allows for protection of specifically altered organisms. Id. The United
States does not exclude from patentability any form of subject matter that meets the
statutory definition of being a "new and useful process, article of manufacture, machine
or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994); see also Murashige, supra note 14, at
601 (stating that some countries have excluded particular processes and/or products from
patentability).
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biological processes for the production of plants or animals."'3
This exception, derived from European law, is generally thought
to turn on the degree of technical intervention involved in creating
the process. 3 The greater the need for intervention, the less likely
the process is to be classified as "essentially biological" and the
more likely it is to be patentable. 13 2 In contrast non-biological and
microbiological processes related to the production of plants or
animals are patentable under the text of Article 27.3(b).'33 A non-
biological process refers primarily to a therapeutic treatment of
plants that is generally recognized as patentable in Europe.'
34
Microbiological processes are harder to define; generally, they are
thought to involve the use of microorganisms such as "viruses,
algae, bacteria and even cells or cell lines," although the definition
of a microorganism may vary by country.'35 Additionally, it is not
clear how processes involving only "microbiological" steps are to
be treated.'36 These terms and others used in Article 27.3(b) are not
defined in the TRIPs Agreement; they are thus subject to national
interpretation. "'
While Article 27.3(b) primarily creates exceptions to
patentability, it also provides for a minimum level of protection
for plant varieties. Its terms require that "members shall provide
for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an
effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof.'
138
130 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, art. 27.3(b).
131 Correa, supra note 120, at 195.
132 Id. According to this notion, "classical breeding methods are not patentable,"
but genetic engineering methods are patentable. Id.
133 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, art. 27.3(b).
134 Correa, supra note 120, at 196. Non-biological processes would also include
cultivation methods. Id.
135 Id.
136 See id. European law generally considers such limited incorporation of a
microbiological step sufficient to deem the process patentable; other countries may take
a more restrictive view. Id.
137 TANSEY, supra note 1, at 7.
138 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, art. 27.3(b). "The reference to a sui generis
system may be interpreted as alluding to breeders' rights as developed within UPOV and
in the domestic law of many countries." Correa, supra note 120, at 197; see also
TANSEY, supra note 1, at 7 (explaining that the meaning of sui generis is not explicitly




Like many of the terms in this provision, this flexible standard
reflects the international divergence of views on protecting plant
varieties.'39 The different systems currently in use allow for a range
in both "scope and extent of protection."'' ° Article 27.3(b) also
permits members to combine patent systems with other forms of
IPRs, further expanding the possible range and methods of
protection. "'
As this brief summary suggests, the language of Article
27.3(b) is both sweeping and vague.'4 2 It effectuates a temporary
compromise among the many competing interests in the protection
of biotechnology. The provisional nature of this compromise is
evidenced by the inclusion of an early revision date for these
provisions (January 1999). 43 This Article is the "only provision in
the TRIPs Agreement subject to an early revision, special
treatment that again indicates the controversial nature of these
issues. The framers of this Article anticipated a negotiated
revision of the terms of Article 27.3(b) as the primary way of
resolving this controversy.' 4 In addition to lobbying for new
agreements favorable to their interests, countries may also seek
modification and clarification of these nebulous terms through the
use of the World Trade Organization's administrative committees
139 Correa, supra note 120, at 197. In Europe, plant varieties are protected under
"breeder's rights" and may not be patented. In both Japan and the United States,
however, plant varieties are patentable. Id.
140 Id. For example, patent protection covers particular genes, whereas breeder's
rights protection only applies to specific combinations of genes and not the genes
themselves. Id.
41 Id. For example, a system combining patents with other forms of IPR
protections might allow for incorporation of "farmer's rights" which recognize and
compensate for the "ancestral contributions" of traditional farmers in developing new
plant varieties. Id.
142 See Tansey, supra note I, at 7. The three-sentence article contains nine terms
whose meanings are open to debate: "plants, animals, micro-organisms, essentially
biological processes, non-biological, microbiological, plant varieties, effective and sui
generis system." Id.
143 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, art. 27.3(b). "The provisions of this
subparagraph shall be reviewed four years after the date of entry into the force of the
WTO Agreement." Id. The WTO Agreement entered into force on January 1, 1995.
Correa, supra note 120, at 198.
I" Correa, supra note 120, at 198.
145 See McCabe, supra note 7, at 45.
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and dispute settlement procedures.'46 In order to understand these
options, it is necessary to understand the structure and
organization of the WTO.
IV. The Structure and Function of the World Trade
Organization
The WTO is a rules-based organization whose primary
objective is "to help trade flow smoothly, freely, fairly, and
predictably."'4 7 Its main functions are administration of trade
agreements, ' establishment of a forum for trade negotiations,
resolution of trade disputes, review of national trade policies,
cooperation with other international organizations,'49 and provision
of support for developing countries in trade policy issues.'5 ° The
Ministerial Conference is the top-level decision-making body
within the WTO.'5 ' It is composed of all WTO members,'52 meets
at least once every two years,' and acts by consensus to affect
matters under any of the multilateral trade agreements.'
146 See id. at 63.
147 World Trade Organization, The WTO in Brief: Part 2 The Organization, at
http://www.wto.org/wto/english/thewto-e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr02_e.htm (last visited
Sept. 9, 2000).
148 In addition to the TRIPs Agreement, the WTO also administers the Agreement
on Trade in Goods and the Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). World Trade
Organization, The Agreements, Overview: A Navigational Guide, at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto e/whatise/tife/agrml-e.htm (last visited September 9, 2000).
49 For example, one of the provisions of the TRIPs Agreement involves
cooperation with the World Intellectual Property Organization, which administers the
Paris Convention and other significant treaties. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, art. 68.
150 World Trade Organization, supra note 146.
151 Id.
152 Seattle Meeting, supra note 8, at 1. There are 135 member governments in the
WTO. Id.
153 Id. The last, scheduled meeting of the Ministerial Conference was to be held in
Seattle in November, 1999.
154 World Trade Organization, About the WTO: Whose WTO is it anyway?, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tif.e/orgl-e.htm (last visited Sept. 9,
2000). In addition to administering the TRIPs Agreement, the WTO monitors the
implementation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade
Negotiations: Agreements on Trade in Goods, 33 I.L.M. 28 (1994) [hereinafter
Agreement on Trade in Goods] and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-
Multilateral Trade Negotiations: General Agreement on Trade in Services, 33 I.L.M. 44
(1994) [hereinafter Agreement on Trade in Services]. Id.
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Between Ministerial Conference meetings, the General
Council supervises the WTO's day-to-day work, which is carried
out by committees focused on specific tasks or areas of trade.'
Among these specialized committees, the Council for Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs Council) monitors
the operation and implementation of the TRIPs Agreement.'56 The
transparency commitments of the TRIPs Agreement facilitate this
monitoring process by requiring members to disclosure relevant
laws, regulations, final judicial decisions, and administrative
rulings.'57 Whereas Part III of the TRIPs Agreement provides
limited instruction as to requisite domestic enforcement
measures,'5 8 the TRIPs Council is more a facilitator of the
agreement than an enforcer of its terms.159 The TRIPs Council may
recommend changes to or interpretations of the TRIPs Agreement,
but only the Ministerial Conference, and at times the General
Council, may actually adopt such alterations. '  Thus, any
modifications to Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPs Agreement as a
result of the early review procedure must be adopted through
consensus of the entire WTO membership.'6 ' Additionally,
disputes between members are intended to be resolved not by the
TRIPs Council, but through the structures created by GATT
Article XXIII and the process defined by the Understanding on
155 Id. These focused work groups are also made up of all members of the WTO. Id.
156 See Daphne Yong-d'Herve, Implementation and Administration of TRIPs and
Dispute Settlement, in INTELLECTUAL PROP. & INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A GUIDE TO THE
URUGUAY ROUND TRIPs AGREEMENT, supra note 3 at 74.
15' TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 63.1-63.2.
158 Member states are required to establish fair and equitable civil and
administrative procedures and remedies to enforce IPRs. See TRIPs Agreement, supra
note 4, arts. 42-49. Members must also ensure adequate provisional measures to avoid
irreparable harm to a rights holder while enforcement provisions are being enacted. Id.
art. 50. Special provisions are also made for border and criminal procedures; however,
none of these requirements creates an obligation for members to establish an
enforcement system independent of or in addition to their general law enforcement
procedures. Id. arts. 41.5, 51-60, 61.
159 Yong-d'Herve, supra note 156, at 72.
160 Id. at 74.
161 TANSEY, supra note 1, at 13. Contra McCabe, supra note 7, at 64 (suggesting
that the TRIPs Council may make interpretations of the vague terms in Article 27.3(b)
that would fall short of amendments to the TRIPs Agreement and would not be subject to
review by the Ministerial Conference).
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Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(hereinafter DSU).' 62  This incorporation of a system for
multilateral resolution of intellectual property disputes is one of
the most significant features of the TRIPs Agreement.'6 3
A. The Dispute Settlement Process
In the founding agreement, members of the WTO adopted
dispute settlement mechanisms to be administered by the General
Council, meeting as the Dispute Settlement Body.'64 These
mechanisms, outlined in Article XXIII of the 1994 GATT
agreement, were incorporated into all subsequent Uruguay Round
agreements, including the TRIPs Agreement.'65 Under this scheme,
complaints may be brought for direct violations of or for non-
compliance with the terms of the TRIPs Agreement.'66 Beginning
in January 2000, members may also bring complaints for the loss
of expected benefits under the TRIPs Agreement, whether or not
the challenged action directly violates any terms of the treaty.'67
The filing of a written complaint initiates the DSU
162 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, art. 64.1; see also Gutowski, supra note 40, at
734-35 (explaining the DSU's role in resolving disputes).
163 Yong-d'Herve, supra note 156, at 75.
164 WTO Agreement, supra note 95.
165 Yong-d'Herve, supra note 156, at 75.
166 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. XXIII, l(a) [hereinafter GATT].
167 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, art. 64.2. Article XXIII 1(b) permits the filing
of a complaint:
[I]f any contracting party should consider that a benefit accruing to it directly or
indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the
attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result
of... (b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether
or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement ... TRIPs Agreement,
supra note 4.
The application of Article XXIII l(b) and 1(c) to the TRIPs Agreement was expressly
postponed until January 2000 (five years after the entry into force of the WTO
Agreement). TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 64.2. The implementation delay
reflects a concern on the part of numerous WTO members including the European
Community that non-violation complaints should be limited in relation to IPR
enforcement. Andres Moncayo von Hase, The Application and Interpretation of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in INTELLECTUAL
PROP. AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 21 at 137.
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procedure.'68 This process is intended to be a positive one reaching
a "solution mutually acceptable to the parties."'69 In that spirit, the
first step after the filing of a complaint is consultation between the
involved member states, with the possibility of mediation by the
WTO Director General, if necessary. 7 If resolution cannot be
reached through this consultation process, the complainant party
may request that the Dispute Settlement Body (hereinafter DSB)
convene an expert panel to hear the dispute."' After hearing the
dispute,'7 2 the panel issues a report to the DSB; the DSB then
adopts the panel's recommendation, unless a party appeals' or the
DSB unanimously rejects the proposed resolution. "4
After the panel's or Appellate Body's report is adopted, the
respondent party must comply with the ruling or face sanctions in
the form of compensation to the complainant party or withdrawal
of concessions. " ' In order to avoid delays in achieving resolution
of disputes, there are concrete deadlines set for each phase of the
settlement process. "6 According to this timeline, even if an appeal
is made, the dispute must be resolved within eighteen months of
the filing of the initial written complaint and request for
consultation. 77
168 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
April 15, 1994, Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 1226 [hereinafter DSU].
169 Id.
170 Id. arts. 4-5.
'"' Id. arts. 6-8.
172 Jd. arts. 9-15. In addition to giving each party to the dispute the right to be
heard, the DSU also grants that right to any third-party member countries with a
substantial interest in the matter. Id. art. 10.
173 Id. Appeals are limited to issues of law and are made to a Standing Appellate
Body. The report of the Appellate Body is adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body
[hereinafter DSB] , unless there is a consensus decision not to, and must be accepted
unconditionally by the parties. Id. art. 17.
174 Id. arts. 16, 20.
175 Id. arts. 21, 22. The parties may independently negotiate appropriate
compensatory sanctions, but withdrawal of concessions must be authorized by the DSB.
See id. art. 22. Suspension of concessions is meant to serve as a temporary sanction until
compliance is achieved. Id. Typically, only concessions or obligations in the same sector
as the violation will be affected. Id.
176 See generally id. (describing the deadlines for various phases of arbitration).
177 BANKOLE SODIPO, PIRACY AND COUNTERFEITING: GATT TRIPs AND
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As with other facets of the TRIPs Agreement, the DSU reflects
the divergent interests of the WTO's member states. Article 27.2
of the DSU provides for special legal assistance for developing
nations involved in dispute settlement procedures.'78 Article 24
recognizes the unique situation of the least developed countries
and urges members to refrain from using dispute settlement
procedures against them. 9 Proponents of the DSU mechanism
argue that the model balances out the power differential between
nations.'° For example, the monitoring process prevents developed
countries from unilaterally imposing sanctions against developing
nations for alleged violations of the TRIPs Agreement.'8 ' The DSU
is designed to limit the possibility of bullying maneuvers by
developed nations, while enabling countries dependent upon trade
with those wealthier nations to assert their rights under the
agreement.' 2
The DSU system has generally been successful as a forum for
resolving disputes, with about sixty percent of complaints settled
through consultation without invoking a dispute panel."3
Additionally, frequent use of the DSU system indicates a high
degree of member confidence in it, especially in comparison to the
more adversarial and less often utilized enforcement procedures of
other international agreements.' 4 The application of the DSU
mechanism to enforcement of the TRIPs Agreement in particular
has also met with success, although the process is still in its
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 272 (1997).
178 DSU, supra note 168, art. 27.2.
179 Id. art. 24.
"'0 Gutowski, supra note 40, at 735-36.
181 DSU, supra note 168, art. 22.
182 Gutowski, supra note 40, at 735-36. The creation of an enforceable, non-
discriminatory multilateral trade system was the stated goal of developing nations
throughout the Uruguay Round negotiations. Id. at 736.
183 Id. at 737. These numbers refer to use of the GATT procedure generally, not
specifically in enforcement of the TRIPs Agreement. See id. Complainant countries in
particular have been satisfied with the procedure, reporting a satisfaction rate of almost
ninety percent. Id.
184 Id. The International Court of Justice, the enforcement mechanism for the Paris
Convention, heard less than 100 cases in its first fifty years of existence. In contrast, over
400 cases have been taken through the GATT system. See id.
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infancy.'85 Thus far, the system has been used almost exclusively
by developed nations to ensure compliance with the specific terms
of the TRIPs Agreement. '86 The balance of power in the system is
likely to even out as the range of possible complaints expands to
include non-violations ' and as more technological developments
emerge from developing nations.'88 The strength of these
enforcement procedures shapes the impact of the specific terms of
the TRIPs Agreement and will likely influence the slated revisions
of Article 27.3(b).
B. Review of Article 27.3(b)
The TRIPs Agreement mandated review of Article 27.3(b)
beginning in January 1999, but it did not define the procedure or
scope for the review. ' Because of the extended timeframe for
transitional arrangements for developing countries,'90 this review is
slated to begin before most members will even have attempted to
implement the current TRIPs provisions.'" The lack of data
185 Id. at 737-39. As of 1999, over 100 cases were making their way through the
system, indicating significant international confidence in the system. Id. at 743-44.
186 WTO Document Dissemination Facility, at http://www.wto.org/ddf/ep/public
.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2000). A review of the documents on intellectual property
disputes available through the WTO's on-line reporting facility listed twenty-one
complaints brought to enforce the TRIPs Agreement. All of these complaints were
brought by developed countries and over half of them were filed by the United States.
Eight of these complaints were filed against developing nations. See id. (These numbers
were arrived at by searching the database for all intellectual property dispute documents
(search under Dispute Settlement Body Symbol: IP/D). This search produces cites for
each IP-related complaint brought to the Dispute Settlement Body, as well as, any
resolution that has occurred. The results must be culled to determine which cites indicate
new causes of action and which refer to resolutions of previously filed charges. The first
party cited on each claim is the defendant to the action, and the party requesting
consultation is the complainant.)
187 J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property
Protection under the TRIPs Component of the WTO Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL PROP.
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPs AGREEMENT, supra note 21, at 79. In particular,
once GATT Article XXIII 1 (b) applies to the TRIPs Agreement, allowing complaints for
nullification of expected benefits, developing countries are likely to seek to hold
developed nations accountable for their responsibility to provide technical assistance
under Article 67 of the TRIPs Agreement. Id. at 78.
188 Id. at 78.
189 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, art. 27.3(b).
190 Id. arts. 65.2-65.4.
191 TANSEY, supra note 1, at 13.
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documenting the effects of the first phase of provisions
exacerbates the difficulty of redefining the Agreement's
understanding on issues related to patenting biological entities.
19 2
Some members argue that the review should be an examination of
the extent to which the current provisions have been
implemented. '93 Other members favor a more substantive process
that might encompass changing the text of the article.'94
One possible solution to this difficulty might be to summarily
execute a review, postponing any significant substantive or
procedural changes until more information is available.'95 Such
preservation of the status quo would maintain the tentative
compromise reached on issues of IPRs in relation to biotechnology
and life forms.'96 Opponents of this approach focus on the
possibility that members may attempt to bypass WTO amendment
procedures and define the vague terms of Article 27.3(b) through
other means. 197
One such avenue is the TRIPs Council, which some
commentators suggest has the power to modify the TRIPs
Agreement without requiring the approval of the Ministerial
Conference.'98 This procedural loophole turns on interpretation of
the language of Article 71.1 of the agreement, which empowers
the TRIPs Council to "undertake reviews in the light of any
relevant new developments which might warrant modification or
amendment of this Agreement."' 99 Some commentators argue that
this broad language gives the TRIPs Council the authority to issue
statements of interpretation unreviewable by the Ministerial
192 Id.
193 See id. This is the approach advocated by most developed nations. Although
these countries would eventually like to see many of the vague terms of Article 27.3(b)
defined or deleted, they are concerned that any immediate attempt to change the terms
will lead to a weakening of IPR provisions. See id. at 13-14.
'94 See id. at 13. This is the viewpoint espoused by many developing nations
unhappy with any delineation of plants and animals as patentable materials. See id. at 13-
15.
191 See Doane, supra note 93, at 275.
196 See id.
197 See Reichman, supra note 187, at 78, 91.
198 McCabe, supra note 7, at 63-64.
199 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, art. 71.1.
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201Conference so long as they only modify existing TRIPs terms.
Whether the TRIPs Council has this power under Article 71 is
debatable,"' as is whether the Council would exercise that power if
it were available. It is noteworthy, however, that the potential
bypass of the consensus-based decision making of the Ministerial
Conference was suggested specifically in relation to revision of
Article 27.3(b).22
Another possible means of bypassing the Ministerial
Conference is through the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body,
whose panels issue decisions that become binding on the parties
involved and set precedents for other members in future
disputes.1 3 These panels could be used to define nebulous terms
and effectively limit the ability of member countries to determine
the precise scope of IPR holders under domestic laws." The
central concern with clarifying terms through case-by-case
200 See id.
201 Article 71.2 of the TRIPs Agreement outlines the limited situation in which
modification actions may be taken by force of recommendation from the TRIPs Council,
stating that:
[a]mendments merely serving the purpose of adjusting to higher levels of
protection of intellectual property rights achieved, and in force, in other
multilateral agreements and accepted under those agreements by all Members of
the WTO may be referred to the Ministerial Conference for action in accordance
with paragraph 6 of Article X of the WTO Agreement on the basis of a
consensus proposal from the Council for TRIPs.
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, art. 71.2. It is unlikely that a more general ability to
circumvent the amendment procedure was intended in Article 71.1.
202 McCabe, supra note 7, at 63-64. McCabe suggests that the United States, with
the help of Japan and the European Union, could lobby the TRIPs Council to issue a
statement of interpretation ruling that Article 27.3(b) requires the extension of patent
protection to plants or animals made by non-biological and microbiological processes.
Id. He advocates this approach as a way to extend the protection available under the
TRIPS agreement without having to achieve consensus in the Ministerial Conference. Id.
203 Reichman, supra note 187, at 78, 91.
204 See Moncayo von Hase, supra note 167, at 141. Article 27.3(b) is not the only
provision of the TRIPs Agreement susceptible to interpretation and expansion through
the DSU mechanism. See id. For example, Article 41.5 gives member states the right not
to augment their judicial and administrative systems in order to provide for TRIPs-
required IPR protection. See id. Many developing countries have rudimentary
infrastructures and limited resources to administer the requisite IPR framework. See id.
Dispute panels are likely to be faced with the challenge of distinguishing between willful
non-compliance with the obligations of the agreement and genuine lack of capacity to do
so. Reichman, supra note 187, at 77.
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decision making is that it will produce shortsighted decisions with
unfortunate local and international effects."5
As of yet, no complaints have been filed concerning the terms
of Article 27.3(b), °6 so no attempts have been made to abuse the
DSU process by circumventing the negotiating bodies of the
WTO. Despite the lack of direct legal action, the threat of such
action may still affect domestic policy decisions regarding
interpretation of the terms of the Article.27 This potential effect in
addition to general dissatisfaction with the Article's current terms
make it likely that the review process will attempt to alter the
specific provisions of Article 27.3(b). °8 Attempts at substantive
revision of Article 27.3(b) will pose additional challenges arising
from the WTO structure.00
V. The Implications of Using the WTO Framework to
Establish Global IPRs
A. The Difficulty of Action by the WTO
According to the WTO Agreement,20unanimous action by
either the Ministerial Conference or the General Council is
required to amend the TRIPs Agreement. 2' This requirement of
consensus is likely to hamper any attempts to significantly revise
the terms of Article 27.3(b) during the early review process. As
has been suggested, the issues involved in patenting life forms are
205 See Reichman, supra note 187, at 91.
206 TANSEY, supra note 1, at 17.
207 Id. Governments may refrain from following reasonable and appropriate
interpretations of the Article's terms out of fear of opening themselves to costly legal
challenges. See id.
208 See id. at 14-15. In September 1999, Kenya, on behalf of many African
countries, tabled a proposal to institute a moratorium on implementing Article 27.3(b) of
the TRIPs Agreement. This proposal also called for complete exclusion from patentabilty
plants, animals, and microorganisms. Non-governmental organizations also supported
this proposal. Trips, Patents and the WTO Farm Trade Talks, AGRA EUROPE A/3,
October 15, 1999, available at LEXIS, Agriculture, Fishing and Tobacco Stories, IAC-
ACC-NO: 56914962.
209 See infra notes 210-65 and accompanying text.
210 See WTO Agreement, supra note 94.
211 Yong-d'Herve, supra note 156, at 74. Proposals for amendment may be made by
any member country or by the TRIPs Council. Id.
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highly controversial. 2,2 The differences among WTO member
countries in philosophy, policy,, and priorities concerning IPR
protection of biological entities are most pronounced between
developing and developed nations.23
Economically, countries clash over whether to focus on
encouraging the cheapest and most widespread use of technology
or on preventing piracy and misappropriation of innovations. 4
The increasing privatization of knowledge is a concern for
developing countries attempting to expand their domestic
economies and technological and scientific resource bases."5 In
addition to a likely immediate increase in the cost of acquiring
technological developments, a particular concern for these
countries in relation to biotechnology is the trickle-down effect
that enhanced IPR protection is likely to have on breeding
materials.26 Studies of the flow of germplasm (breeding materials
of plants) indicate that stronger IPRs lead to restricted access to
these supplies, which in turn inhibits the development of new plant
varieties, especially through publicly funded research.2 7
On the other side of this issue, the economies of many
developed countries are becoming increasingly dependent on the
products of the mind.28 Such dependency makes these countries
particularly wary of weak IPR regimes that allow for the copying
212 See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text; infra notes 214-28 and
accompanying text.
213 TANSEY, supra note 1. The marked contrast between the interests of developed
and developing countries overshadows the divergence of interests between nations
within each of these groupings. Id. at 14-15. Among developed countries, differences
primarily focus on the nature and scope of IPR protection. Id. at 14. "The developing
countries have a wide range of interest depending on their factors such as: whether they
are net food importers or exporters; how extensive their biodiversity is; the nature of
their farming economy; the degree of industrialisation [sic]; and whether they have an
established biotech industry or not." Id.
214 Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, Conflicting Theories of Economic Value, in
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW, supra note 32, at 50-51.
215 Tara Kalagher Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Intellectual Property Protection in
Developing Countries, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW, supra note 32 at
445-46.
216 TANSEY, supra note 1, at 19.
217 Id. at 19-20. This concern has impacted the seed industry in particular, which has
actively sought to ensure an adequate flow of germplasm. Id.
218 Giunta & Shang, supra note 215, at 446.
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of valuable advancements, especially in the lucrative, but
vulnerable field of biotechnology. 29 The divergent economic
interests between developed and developing countries will make it
difficult to reach consensus as to how the terms of Article 27.3(b)
should be revised.2
Cultural differences between WTO member nations may also
pose challenges to achieving consensus on these issues.2 ' The
frameworks for IPR regimes in most developed countries
recognize the rights of one inventor to the "'new' knowledge" he
has created. 22 Not only do the cultures of many developing
countries fundamentally disagree with this concept, 223 but they
would like to broaden the definition of who can be a holder of an
IPR.22 Indeed, there is a growing movement to recognize
communal rights in intellectual property, particularly for
indigenous cultures.22
In light of these concerns, some commentators advocate the
incorporation of provisions or concepts from the Biodiversity
Convention into the TRIPs Agreement.2 6 Not only does the
219 Id. Recent studies conducted by the United States government indicate that
billions of dollars and thousands of jobs are lost each year due to counterfeiting
practices. Id.
220 TANSEY, supra note 1, at 14-15. For example, the United States would ultimately
like to delete the clause allowing plants and animals to be exempted from patentability.
Id. In contrast, advocates in some developing countries want to maintain the patentability
exemptions and delete the requirement of a sui generis system of protection for plant
varieties. See id.
221 See generally David Hurlbut, Hegel, Individual Will and Non- Western Cultures,
in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW, supra note 32 at 35-39 (discussing the
historical and cultural influences that have shaped European, African, and Indian
conceptualizations of intellectual property).
222 Tejera, supra note 88, at 974. This individual rights concept is the basis for the
current form of the TRIPs agreement. See id.
223 TANSEY, supra note 1, at 18. Many indigenous "religious and cultural traditions
regard the extension of patents to living organisms" as a commodification of life and an
attempt to recognize a human stake in what is essentially a divine creation. Id. An
additional concern of many of these cultures is that the recognition of such IPR rights
will ultimately lead to disruption of the interdependence of the natural world. Id.
224 See Primo Braga, supra note 214, at 48-49. This broadened definition is, in part,
a reflection of the higher value developing countries generally place on social interests,
loosely defined, over public interests. Id.
225 Tejera, supra note 88, at 968-71.
226 Id. at 980-86; Sarma, supra note 16, at 120-22. To this end, representatives from
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Biodiversity Convention recognize the right of indigenous cultures
to preserve their knowledge and resources, it also places
significant value on protecting natural resources and ensuring that
their custodians share in the rewards of their commercial use while
monitoring their exploitation. 227 These concepts find widespread
support in many developing countries, but may also be the reason
some developed nations hesitated in signing the Biodiversity
Convention.228
This clash in cultural values is likely to become more
pronounced as each side attempts to alter or do away with the parts
of Article 27.3(b) most in conflict with their norms and
priorities. 229 The TRIPs Agreement is founded on concepts of
intellectual property that are predominant in developed countries,
but attempts have been made to incorporate other value systems
into the Agreement. 230 The contentious debates that are likely to
ensue will make achieving new consensus on these issues
challenging at best. Thus, the consensus requirement imposed by
the WTO's structure will likely make significant developments in
this area difficult.
B. The Legitimacy of Action by the WTO
Despite the requirement of consensus action, developing
countries distrust the WTO in general, and the TRIPs Agreement
the Convention on Biological Diversity, as well as the UPOV and the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, were asked to provide relevant
information about their activities to the TRIPs Council as a preliminary step in the
review of Article 27.3(b). TANSEY, supra note 1, at 13.
227 See Tejera, supra note 88, at 982-84.
228 See Sarma, supra note 16, at 121. The United States delayed in joining the
Biodiversity Convention in part because it required "compensation for use of biological
resources and transfer of technology." Id.
229 TANSEY, supra note 1, at 14-15.
230 Sarma, supra note 16, at 121. India is a developing country at the forefront of the
fight against the priorities imposed by developed nations; Indian patent law refuses to
recognize IPRs in the area of biodiversity. Id. at 132. Furthermore, Indian representatives
are lobbying for changes to the current Article 27.3(b) provisions to accommodate this
stand. See TANSEY, supra note 1, at 16. Additional resistance to the TRIPs terms is
evidenced by the fact that WTO dispute and appellate panels were compelled to order the
Indian legislature to establish adequate protections for pharmaceutical and agricultural
products in compliance with the requirements of Article 70.8. Gutowski, supra note 41,
at 741-42.
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in particular because they perceive them as a means for developed
nations to assert power and inculcate their value systems.23
Decisions concerning IPR protection for biological entities
implicate issues of economics, religion, health, agriculture,
environmentalism, and cultural identity.232 Attempts to harmonize
this body of law traditionally governed by individual nations have
grave implications for the, concept of national sovereignty.
233
Although the TRIPs Agreement does not dictate the manner in
which its provisions are incorporated into members' domestic
policies,"' the scope and nature of the rights it establishes
represent a significant increase in external influence on substantive
local decisions. 3 ' The effect of this influence can be seen in an
analysis of the potential modes of review for Article 27.3(b).
The current text of Article 27.3(b) represents a compromise
among the different policy interests of WTO member states. It
provides greater protection than some countries would prefer and
less than others would like.236 Under this scheme, a minimum
standard of patentability is established, although countries are
allowed to provide stronger protection than the terms mandated by
the agreement.237 Typically, any advocated changes would lead to
less flexibility and greater substantive harmonization of domestic
231 Sarma, supra note 16, at 125. This distrust exists despite WTO Treaty provisions
asserting that all WTO contracting parties are considered equals and that the outlined
decision-making process is a democratic one. Id. One commentator suggests that the
differences in resources between members of the WTO do in fact call into question the
equity of the negotiating parties and the legitimacy of decisions made. TANSEY, supra
note 1, at 19.
232 TANSEY, supra note 1, at 18-22.
233 Gutowski, supra note 41, at 744-47.
234 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, art. 1.1. This Article specifically provides that
"[m]embers shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the
provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice." Id.
235 Gutowski, supra note 41, at 745.
236 Doane, supra note 93, at 275. Developed countries generally see this
compromise as providing insufficient protection for the burgeoning biotechnology
industry. Id.
237 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, art. 27. A comparison of the language of the
subsections of this Article delineates the basic guidelines that are established and the
flexibility that countries may exercise in raising this floor of protection. Id. Article 27.1
uses the language "shall be available" in setting forth the minimum requirements of
patentability, whereas Articles 27.2 and 27.3 use the language "may exclude" in
outlining the possible subject matter exceptions to those requirements. See id.
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patent laws.238
In practice, the trend in harmonization of patent laws is to
move toward the standards established by developed countries. "
With respect to Article 27.3(b), this would mean deleting the
patentability exceptions of Article 27.3(b) .2 " As has been
indicated, this change would drastically alter the level of IPR
protection currently available in most developing nations. 24 Such
a change would not only entail a shift in policy, but would also
require a significant bolstering of most countries' infrastructures to
adequately enforce such rights.242 The questionable wisdom of
requiring a developing country to use its limited resources to
enforce primarily foreign property rights presents a significant
obstacle to establishing more expansive IPRs.21' Another hurdle is
the symbolic significance of turning over such important decisions
to an international body with questionable equity among member
governments and little accountability to individual citizens.2 4
With the increasing interconnectedness of the global
community, concerns about loss of individual national identity and
sovereign control are not unique to the TRIPs Agreement;
however, as it is a component of the WTO, it can be a lightning
238 See Reichman, supra note 187, at 29-30, 40-41.
239 Long & D'Amato, supra note 34, at 9.
240 TANSEY, supra note 1, at 14. Article 27.3(b) excludes from patentability "plants
and animals other than microorganisms, and essentially biological processes for the
production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological
processes." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 27.3(b). Deleting these exceptions, the
stance advocated by the United States, would bring the terms of the TRIPs Agreement
into line with American patent laws. TANSEY, supra note 1, at 13-14. This change is
generally supported by the agricultural, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical industries
and therefore would likely be favored by other developed nations as well. Id.
241 See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text; supra notes 220-27 and
accompanying text.
242 See Reichman, supra note 187, at 87.
243 Gutowski, supra note 41, at 749. For example, Disney attempted to enforce its
copyright against Chilean Marxists to limit distribution of a book entitled How to Read
Donald Duck. Id. "One might well question the wisdom of countries beleaguered by the
challenges and social costs of malnutrition, child prostitution, sex tourism, AIDS, foreign
debt, and structural adjustment policies putting scarce resources into tracking down those
who would appropriate Looney Tunes characters .... Id. at 749.
244 See TANSEY, supra note 1, at 18-19.
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rod for such issues.245 The TRIPs Agreement and the WTO are part
of the changing face of international law. Traditionally,
international law focused on duties and obligations owed between
sovereign states, and affected citizens only through the
intermediary of their sovereign.246 Historically, this area of law
focused on issues over which conflicts between nations were
likely to arise and domestic policies and interests were typically
weak.247 In this context, conflicts between international law and
domestic law were minimal.248
In recent years, political249 and societal250 trends have converged
to increase the interconnectedness of national interests and shrink
the realm in which state action can occur without reliance on or
repercussions for the interests of other countries. 21' The new
international laws that have emerged from this evolving
globalization are different in both form and function from their
predecessors.252 The new laws operate through international bodies
that promulgate rules constraining individuals fairly directly, and
245 Lynton K. Caldwell, Is World Law an Emerging Reality? Environmental Law in
a Transnational World, 10 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 227, 227-29 (1999); see
also Seattle Meeting, supra note 9, at 27-35 (discussing WTO critics concerns about the
alleged conflict between economic, health, and national sovereignty issues and the
WTOs enforcement of trade rules).
246 Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law-Legitimacy, Accountability,
Authority and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1555, 1563
(1999).
247 Id. at 1561. For example, admiralty is an area where international law has
historically been active and domestic legislation has been limited. Id.
248 Id.
249 The relevant political trends of the last century are: a recognition of the role
international law can play in relation not just between rulers but also between ruler and
ruled, see id. at 1569; separation of principles of national self-determination from
concepts of pure citizenry and state sovereignty, see id.; and emergence of international
institutions from the rubble of the three great conflicts of the twentieth century, World
War I, World War II, and the Cold War which have significantly formalized the practice
of international law. Id. at 1569-74.
250 The relevant societal trends of the last century are: "(1) [the development of]
science and its application in technology; (2) [the] dissemination of information; (3)
popular organized action in public affairs; (4) [the] emergence of international
environmental organizations; (5) global economic growth; and (6) [the] proliferation of
people." Caldwell, supra note 244, at 230.
251 Id. at 228-30.
252 See Stephan, supra note 246, at 1563.
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these bodies have a much more formal institutional structure than
did their predecessors.253 Functionally, many of the recent laws
promulgated by these international bodies effectively supplant
domestic regulations.254 These changes have led to concerns over
the waning importance of the nation state and the increasing
influence of global corporations and other non-governmental
actors.2" Notwithstanding the significance of these developments,
the weightiest criticism of this new world order is that it brings
with it a striking deficit of accountability.256
The legitimacy of domestic government is typically gauged by
the ability of its citizens to hold lawmakers accountable for their
actions. 57 In the planning stages, accountability can be achieved
through the peoples' influence over the content of the decisions
made. 258 As policy decisions are implemented, an individual's
ability to exit, or opt out of, the system also checks the use of the
sovereign power.2 159 As international organizations begin behaving
in ways similar to national governments, questions of the
legitimacy of such conduct and the demand for accountability
through exit and voice become relevant as well.26°
One of the most frequently cited concerns about the WTO and
its subordinate organizations is that they displace national
policymakers and operate through an unrepresentative decision-
making process.61 In response to these accusations, supporters of
253 Id. Examples of these bodies include the WTO, the European Court of Justice,
and the International Monetary Fund. See id.
254 Id. at 1561.
255 Id. at 1562; see also Caldwell, supra note 245, at 234-35 (stating that
multinational corporations' activities will impact the global environment and promote
new provisions in international law in this area).





261 Seattle Meeting, supra note 9, at 27-29. For example, the TRIPs Agreement
establishes essentially global minimum standards of IPR protection. Id. These rights are
essentially created in private parties, but can only be redressed through action by national
governments. Id. The direct impact on individual citizens who have little ability to
influence the decisions being made strikes at the heart of these concerns. Reichman,
supra note 187, at 77.
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the WTO model emphasize its voluntary membership and
operation by consensus.262 As one commentator points out,
however, emphasizing waiver of sovereign immunity by sovereign
states does not address the issue of lack of individual influence
over an increasingly powerful standard-setting body.263 As the
members of the WTO attempt to deal with highly controversial
issues such as those implicated by Article 27.3(b), questions
surrounding the legitimacy of such decisions are likely to become
more pronounced.264 Who is involved in making these decisions
and whether and how their voices are heard and valued will affect
the outcome of the review process.265
VI. Conclusion
Global harmonization of substantive IPR laws arguably offers
significant benefit to the world economy, as well as to individual
nations.266 Over the course of the twentieth century, international
agreements on IPRs have slowly moved in the direction of
establishing global minimum protective standards.267  These
standards have tended to emerge from the existing laws and
philosophies of developed nations with little accommodation for
262 Sara Dillon, Fuji-Kodak, the WTO, and the Death of Domestic Political
Constituencies, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 197, 204-06 (1999).
263 Id. "Many experts justify the WTO system by noting that individual states have
ratified the WTO Agreement. Even so, the state cannot legitimately waive the
democratic rights of its citizens to influence the content of national legislation (footnotes
omitted)." Id. at 205.
264 Id. Article 27.3(b) addresses the level of IPR protection and thus the potential
cost of biotechnology products essential to the life and health of the world's citizens. See
id.
265 TANSEY, supra note 1, at 14. In addition to member states, non-governmental
organizations like biotechnology companies are likely to have a significant influence on
the outcome of the review process, at least indirectly. Id. There is also a movement to
involve indigenous cultures in decisions on biotechnology patenting. Sarma, supra note
16, at 127-29. Only through joining interest groups that petition their national
representatives, however, can an average citizen have a role in the process.
266 Murashige, supra note 14, at 592-95. The primary benefit of harmonization is
the encouragement of research in beneficial areas and the stimulation of the marketing
and distribution of the fruits of those labors worldwide. Id. at 594-95. In the short term,
these benefits will accrue most directly to developed countries. Id. In the long run,
however, developing countries are also expected to reap these benefits and profit from an
attendant increase in the transfer of technology. Id.
267 Monroe et al., supra note 2, at 6-19.
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the divergent cultures and interests of less developed countries."'
The apex of this still-emerging trend has been the creation of the
WTO and the signing of the TRIPs Agreement.
The TRIPs Agreement combines basic guidelines for IPR
protection with significant enforcement mechanisms, effectively
revolutionizing international intellectual property law. 269 Although
the TRIPS Agreement signifies a giant step toward globalizing
IPRs, this movement has just begun. One of the most significant
hurdles will be finding common ground between the many
divergent interests affected by IPR standards °.2 " These differences
are particularly notable in the area of protection of biotechnology
innovations."' The concept of patenting life forms has moral,
social, economic, cultural, and religious implications, making
mutual agreement on appropriate treatment difficult to achieve. 2
A tenuous compromise on these issues was reached with the
creation of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPs Agreement. 3 The
scheduled review of the terms of this compromise is likely to
produce conflict over the specific standards set, as well as the
processes used to establish them.274 Proceeding with caution is
therefore essential under the circumstances.
Although ostensibly a representative body, the WTO is
criticized for having limited accountability and not giving equal
weight to the interests of all its members.7 ' In order to produce
lasting achievements in establishing the substantive IPR policies
many feel are crucial to fostering international trade, the WTO
must first ensure that its actions are perceived as legitimate by
both its sovereign member states and their citizens. As such, the
process of reviewing and revising the terms of Article 27.3(b) will
prove just as important as the outcome achieved.
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